This paper examines how anticipated and frequently repeated shocks are absorbed in liquid financial markets. We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days leading up to subsequent Treasury auctions and recover shortly after, despite the fact that both the exact time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. This price pattern implies a substantial issuance cost to the Treasury Department, estimated to be between 9 and 18 basis points of the auction size; for example, it amounts to over half a billion dollars for issuing Treasury notes alone in 2007. These results appear to be consistent with the hypothesis of dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and the imperfect capital mobility of end-investors (e.g., local and foreign governments, insurance companies, pension funds, etc.), highlighting the important role of market frictions even in the most liquid and important financial markets. JEL Classification Numbers: G12.
I. Introduction
In this paper, we empirically examine how anticipated and frequently repeated supply shocks are absorbed in liquid financial markets. In particular, we examine the temporary price impacts of Treasury security auctions on the secondary Treasury and repo markets.
This may appear as a surprising agenda: Treasury auctions are conducted every month, of which the exact dates and amounts are announced in advance, so these events are largely anticipated. Given the size and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury and repo markets, one might expect no appreciable price impacts from these anticipated events. 1 In sharp contrast to this conventional view, our evidence reveals significant temporary price effects in both markets around Treasury auctions.
Specifically, we find that Treasury auctions exert significant price pressure in the secondary Treasury market during the 5 to 10 trading days leading up to these auctions and that this price pressure gradually dissipates in the subsequent 5 to 10 days. An intuitive way to describe this price dip and recovery pattern is to compare Treasury returns around auctions: For example, the 5-day cumulative return of an on-the-run 2-year Treasury note before the subsequent 2-year note auction is, on average, 8.89
(t=2.93) basis points lower than the 5-day post-auction return of the same security.
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Similarly, this 5-day return differential is, on average, 22.54 (t=3.67) basis points for 5-year notes around subsequent 5-year note auctions, and 23.84 (t=1.78) basis points for 10-year notes around subsequent 10-year note auctions. It is important to note that Treasury auctions are repeated frequently, and hence the short windows surrounding the auction days cover a significant fraction of all trading days. For example, 2-year Treasury notes are auctioned virtually every month in our sample, and the 20-day window surrounding each auction covers almost all trading days.
These findings have important economic implications. First of all, they suggest that the cost of security issuance borne by the Treasury Department is an order of 1 In 2008, the total size of Treasury securities outstanding is $10 trillion (from Treasury Department website), and the estimated size of the repo market is over $10 trillion (Gorton and Metrick (2010) ).
magnitude larger than what is suggested by prior literature on Treasury auction underpricing. This strand of research usually compares the auction price with a benchmark price on the auction day, and finds the markup to be around 1 basis point of the auction size. 3 Our findings suggest that, because of the price impact of Treasury auctions, these benchmark prices on auction days are already depressed. Therefore, while the traditional approach is appropriate for measuring underpricing in auctions, it does not reflect the total issuance cost borne by the Treasury Department.
To incorporate this price impact into our cost measure, we take the average price of a corresponding Treasury security in the secondary market on the t th day before and the t th day after each auction as the benchmark price, with t ranging from 1 to 10. 4 That is, our measure reflects the amount of money the Treasury Department could have saved were it able to issue Treasury securities at the average secondary market price during the several days before and after each auction. For t=5, for example, our estimates of Treasury issuance costs for 2-, 5-, and 10-year notes are 9.07, 16.81, and 18.43 basis points of the auction size, respectively. These figures represent substantial costs to the Treasury Department, which are orders of magnitude larger than the bidask spreads in the Treasury market. For example, Fleming (2003) documents that the interdealer bid-ask spreads, in price, for the on-the-run 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year notes are merely 0.66, 1.22, and 2.44 basis points, respectively.
According to these estimates, the total cost of issuing Treasury notes alone in 2007 is $643 million. This cost is likely to be substantially higher in the near future when the U.S. government faces an unprecedented budget deficit. While it is by no means clear whether part of the estimated cost can be saved through better designs of the Treasury selling mechanism, recognizing such a cost is a necessary first step to understand and improve its efficiency.
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3 See, for example Goldreich (2007) . 4 An alternative benchmark is the yield of the auctioned security during the first a few trading days. This alternative estimate implies an even larger issuance cost.
Second, our findings suggest that the frictions behind investors' slow response to demand/supply shocks are of first-order importance even in the most liquid financial markets. A simple long-short strategy that exploits these large and reoccurring swings in Treasury returns around auction days yields a Sharpe ratio that is comparable to many well-known asset pricing anomalies, such as currency carry trades and price momentum.
For example, by going short in the on-the-run 2-year note and long in a durationmatched portfolio comprising the on-the-run 6-month Treasury bill and 10-year note during the 10 days before each 2-year note auction, and holding reversed positions during the 10 days after, an investor can achieve an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.08. In comparison, the Sharpe ratios are around 0.59-0.95 for currency carry trades, and 0.47-0.75 for price momentum strategies in the U.S. stock market. 6 These results also hold in the more recent period when trading costs in the Treasury market are minimal. For example, in the last ten years of our sample, the Sharpe ratio of our strategy is 1.44; even after accounting for the bid-ask spread, it remains close to 1. Moreover, the documented return pattern implies large swings in bond premium around auction days each month. Even our most conservative estimate implies that the post-auction annualized bond premium is 2.3% higher than its pre-auction counterpart. This difference is economically significant given that the unconditional bond premium is only 1.4% in our sample, thus posing a big challenge for asset pricing models.
Finally, the shocks analyzed here are small relative to the size of Treasury markets. In the last 10 years, the average auction size of Treasury notes is merely 0.3% of the Treasury market size. 7 If one takes into account the amount of Treasury securities maturing in each month, the net supply shock is even smaller. In addition, the timing and size of Treasury auctions are announced in advance, making Treasury auctions a clean setting to analyze price effects of uninformed selling. Our evidence that even the Treasury market is unable to quickly absorb these anticipated small shocks, repeatedly, suggests that market frictions play a perhaps more important role in the overall 6 See, e.g., Brunnermeir, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) , Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2008) , and Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2010) . 7 In contrast, the demand shocks analyzed in Shleifer (1986) are close to 3% of the shares outstanding.
financial system than previously thought. 8 It is thus reasonable to expect that similar effects play an even bigger role in less liquid markets, such as corporate bond and structured product markets.
The documented return pattern is consistent with the interpretation that Treasury auctions exert temporary price impacts in secondary Treasury markets. 9 The underlying mechanism has two ingredients. First, primary dealers, who are expected to participate actively and to submit competitive bids in all Treasury auctions, have limited risk-bearing capacity. 10 They hence hedge part of the risk they are about to acquire in Treasury auctions by short selling similar securities in the secondary market before these auctions, which puts price pressure on the secondary market. 11 Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the price impact in the secondary Treasury market is more pronounced precisely when the total risk to be acquired by primary dealers is larger; for instance, when the auction size is larger or when interest rates are more volatile (as implied by Treasury options). More directly, Fleming and Rosenberg (2007) provide evidence that primary dealers take short positions in both the secondary Treasury market and when-issued market before Treasury auctions. no publicly available data on these holdings, it seems reasonable to expect that many of them do not have the intention, or resources, to engage in short-term arbitrage trades.
In addition, insurance companies and bond mutual funds, which account for around 13% of private holdings, are also likely to be unresponsive to the temporary price movements around auctions. For example, we find 70% of the insurance companies in the U.S. make less than 5 trades a year in Treasury markets. Index bond mutual funds (and many other bond mutual funds benchmarked to various indices), due to concerns of tracking errors, are likely to avoid newly issued securities before they are included in the indices they are tracking.
14 12 For example, on June 1, 2004, the Treasury Department issued around $25 billion 2-year notes, but there were $27 billion worth of Treasury securities maturing on the previous day. 13 The data on the ownership of Treasury securities are from http://fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html.
14 Many fixed-income indices usually adjust their composition at the end of each month. For example, Barclays US Treasury Bond Index adjusts its composition on the last calendar day of each month; see, https://ecommerce.barcap.com/indices.
Our interpretation has a number of further predictions. First, it implies that repo rates tend to be lower before Treasury auctions. To take short positions in the secondary Treasury market, primary dealers usually borrow Treasury securities through "reverse repo" transactions. Specifically, primary dealers lend cash to their counterparties and take Treasury securities as collateral, which they then short-sell in secondary markets. Primary dealers' strong demand for these transactions implies that they would be willing to accept lower interest rates on their lending, thus leading to lower repo rates before auctions. Since this hedging activity is expected to last only for a few days, its impact should be stronger for overnight repo rates than for long-term repo rates. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the average overnight generalcollateral repo rates during the 5 days before 2-year note auctions is 6.75 (t=4.83) basis points lower than that during the 5 days after. The pattern for one-week term repo rates is slightly weaker, with a rate differential of 4.39 (t=4.36) basis points, while that for one-month repo rates is virtually absent.
Second, the above documented phenomenon is not specific to on-the-run securities. Since off-the-run notes are close substitutes to on-the-run ones, our interpretation implies that the price impact around auctions should also arise for offthe-run securities. Indeed, we find that the return pattern of off-the-run notes is almost identical to that of on-the-run notes. Finally, auctions of Treasury securities with one maturity should also affect prices of other maturities, and the impact should be stronger if the maturity differential is smaller. Consistent with this prediction, we find a similar price pattern on 10-year notes around both 2-year and 5-year note auctions, even when there is no 10-year note auction in surrounding days. Moreover, relative to 2-year note auctions, 5-year note auctions have a much stronger price impact on 10-year notes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related literature and Section III describes the data. Section IV analyzes the impacts of Treasury auctions on the secondary Treasury market. Section V presents the interpretation and further analysis implied by the interpretation. Section VI analyzes the impact on the repo market. Section VII concludes.
II. Related Literature
Our paper is related to the growing literature on the temporary price impact of supply/demand shocks in financial markets. Since the seminal paper by Shleifer (1986) , there has been a proliferation of research examining the effect of uninformed demand shocks on stock returns. For example, Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) , Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) , Coval and Stafford (2007) , Frazzini and Lamont (2008), and Lou (2011) analyze the temporary price effects of index additions/deletions, short-selling induced by mergers and acquisitions, and mutual fund flow-induced trading in the stock market. Newman and Rierson (2003) show that the price impact from the bond issuance of a large European telecom company spills over to the entire related market for European telecom bonds. The contribution of our paper lies in that we provide evidence for temporary price pressure in the most liquid and important financial market where the relatively small supply shocks that we analyze are both well anticipated and frequently repeated. This unique feature of our sample highlights the first-order importance of market frictions to our understanding of asset price formation and evolution.
Our results also complement prior research on the supply effect in the Treasury market. One strand of this research examines the impact of bond supply on yield levels.
For example, Simon (1991) , Duffee (1996) initiated by the Treasury and Federal Reserve. Our paper differs from these studies in that it examines Treasury auctions' temporary price impact both before and after auctions taking place, as well as their spillover effects across maturities and across markets. 15 Another subtle but important feature is that the Treasury supply analyzed in our paper is not net supply (i.e., the auction size minus the amount of maturing Treasury securities), and so our focus is on the frictions for the new securities to "work their way to the end-investors."
Our paper is also related to prior research on the liquidity premium of on-the-run over off-the-run securities. In particular, motivated by the theoretical work of Duffie (1996) , a number of studies (e.g., Jordan and Jordan (1997) , Krishnamurthy (2002) , Meli (2002) , and Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005)) document that the on-the-run premium and the specialness of a newly issued Treasury security in the repo market gradually decrease over time and reach virtually zero at the next issuance. While this mechanism is consistent with the price decrease of the on-the-run security before the next Treasury auction, it cannot explain the price increase after the auction. In addition, this mechanism cannot explain the yield/return pattern of the off-the-run security, or that of the securities with different maturities around Treasury auctions.
Our results are generally consistent with the market segmentation view modeled in Vayanos and Vila (2009) . Preferred-habitat investors cause market segmentation and hence local demand and supply (in our particular case, the short-selling by primary dealers) can distort Treasury yields. This gives rise to profitable opportunities to arbitrageurs, whose trades would smooth the yield curve to some extent, but are unable to completely eliminate local yield effects due to limited risk/capital capacity. Endinvestors (e.g., Federal Reserve, state and local governments, foreign governments, pension funds etc.), despite having sufficient capital to absorb the supply, have other priorities and are slow in responding to these shocks. As a result, part of the local yield effect remains in the data.
Our results thus highlight the key role of not only primary dealers' and arbitrageurs' limited risk-bearing capacity, but more importantly, end-investors' capital immobility. Hence, our study contributes to the recent literature that analyzes capital mobility and its effect on asset prices (e.g., Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) Immediately after the announcement, dealers and investors in the Treasury market start to trade forward contracts on the soon-to-be-issued Treasury security in the "whenissued" market.
In each auction, primary dealers and other competitive bidders submit sealed bids of rate-quantity pairs that specify the amount to be purchased at each minimum yield. Two auction mechanisms have been employed in Treasury auctions: multiple-price and single-price auctions. Under both mechanisms, the clearing price is identified by equating the aggregate demand submitted by competitive bidders to the total issue amount minus the total demand from noncompetitive bidders (i.e., those who submit market orders). The difference between the two mechanisms lies in that, while in multiple-price auctions, competitive bidders pay for their allocated shares at their submitted prices, in single-price auctions, all winning bidders pay the same price. While almost all Treasury auctions in the 1980s were multiple-price auctions, the single-price mechanism is the dominant form in the more recent two decades. In total, we have 332 2-year note auctions, 210 5-year note auctions, and 132 10-year note auctions. 17 We then match our auction data with the CRSP daily U.S. Treasury database to obtain daily Treasury security prices and accrued interests, from which we then compute Treasury yields and daily returns. Throughout our analysis, we use the average of the bid and ask prices reported by CRSP as our measure of the security price.
We supplement our Treasury auction and yield data with four additional data sources. First, we obtain daily repo rates from Bloomberg. Second, to examine insurance companies' trading activities in Treasury markets, we get their trading records from their annual reports to National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). In particular, Schedule D of these reports includes trades by insurance companies in each year and their holdings at the end of the year. 18 Third, we collect from TrimTabs, for the period of 1998-2008, daily investment flows to three major mutual fund classes:
bond mutual funds, equity funds, and hybrid funds. Finally, from Mueller, Vedolin, and
Yen (2011), we obtain the daily model-free estimates of maturity-weighted implied volatility of nearest-to-expiry at-the-money options on the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury securities. 19 Finally, the average maturity-weighted Treasury-auction implied volatility is around 8% in our sample.
IV. Price Impact on Secondary Markets
To analyze the impact of Treasury auctions on the secondary Treasury market, we first examine yields-to-maturity of 2-year notes, the most frequently issued Treasury notes, around subsequent 2-year note auctions. Specifically, for each 2-year note auction, we calculate daily yields to maturity of the on-the-run 2-year note during both the 10 days before and 10 days after the auction and compare them with the yield on the auction day. 20 Since there is a 2-year note auction almost every month in our sample, these 20-day event windows around auctions cover virtually all trading days in our sample period.
The pattern in Treasury yields around auctions can be easily seen in Figure 1 . Table II: For 2-year notes, the yield differences, Y(t)-Y(0), are negative in the entire 20-day window surrounding each auction, and are statistically significant in the 4 days immediately before the auctions and 6 days after the auctions. More specifically, the yield of 2-year notes increases, on average, by 2.53 basis points during the 5-day period before the auctions, but decreases by 2.32 basis points during the 5-day period afterward.
These results suggest that 2-year note auctions exert temporary price pressure on the existing 2-year notes: Secondary market prices are lower on auction days than in surrounding days. Another way to see this price impact is to compare 2-year note returns before and after these auctions. This approach effectively integrates the pre-and post-auction impacts into one measure and so increases the statistical power in detecting such price impact. As shown in Table III , the return of the on-the-run 2-year note on the day prior to the subsequent auction is, on average, 3.68 basis points lower than the return of the same note on the day immediately after the auction, with a t-statistic of 3.90. The return difference is positive and statistically significant in the entire 20-day window: The average cumulative return during the 10 days after auctions is 9.20 basis points higher than that during the 10 days before, with a t-statistic of 2.02. The return differential achieves its maximum on day 6, with a point estimate of 10.2 basis points and a t-statistic of 3.62.
The documented yield and return pattern around subsequent auctions is not unique to 2-year notes. A very similar pattern exists for other maturities. For example, as shown in Table II , the yield of the on-the-run 5-/10-year notes increases by 2.67/1.57 basis points during the 5 days before auctions, and decreases by 2.73/2.00 basis points in the 5 days after. Moreover, as shown in Table III , the cumulative 5-day return of the on-the-run 5-year Treasury note before a 5-year note auction is, on average, 22.54 (t=3.67) basis points lower than the 5-day return of the same note after the auction.
This return differential is 23.84 (t=1.78) basis points for 10-year notes.
A. Economic significance
The temporary movements in Treasury yields around subsequent auctions have a number of important implications. First, they represent a substantial issuance cost borne by the Treasury Department, which has been largely ignored in prior literature.
Second, they imply a potentially large trading profit, even after taking into account bidask spreads. Finally, these large swings in average Treasury returns provide useful guidance for future asset-pricing models. We examine these issues in more detail in this section.
A.1. Large issuance costs
In prior literature, Treasury auction markups are usually measured as the difference between the auction price and some benchmark traded price on auction days (e.g., the secondary market price or the forward price in the when-issue market). While this is perhaps a clean measure of auction underpricing due to winner's curse, it does not reflect the total cost borne by the Treasury Department, as our previous results suggest that the secondary market prices on auction days have already been driven down by these auctions.
To account for the price pressure effect resulting from Treasury auctions, we take as the benchmark price the average secondary Treasury market prices around each auction (rather than on the auction day). For example, for each n-year note auction, the benchmark is the average yield of the on-the-run n-year note during the days around the auction. We then calculate the amount of money the Treasury Department could have saved were it able to issue Treasury notes at this benchmark yield. On the one hand, this may be a conservative estimate since the auctioned security will become "onthe-run" in several days and should be worth more than the soon-to-be-off-the-run security in the secondary market, as suggested by the well-known on-the-run-off-the-run phenomenon (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991) , Krishnamurthy (2002) ). On the other hand, the auctioned security has a slightly longer maturity (e.g., one month longer for 2-year notes) than the existing security in the secondary market. These two forces are likely to cancel each other out. For instance, in our overall sample, the average yield difference between the one-the-run and the first-off-the-run 2-year notes is only 0.08 basis points.
21 Table IV shows that Treasury issues notes at yields that are significantly higher than those in the secondary market. Panel A reports ( ) − � ( ), where ( ) is the auction yield and � ( ) is the average of the on-the-run note yields on the t th day before and t th day after the auction, with t ranging from 1 to 10. The results suggest that auction yields are significantly higher than yields in the secondary market around 21 An alternative measure is to compare the auction yield with the yield of the auctioned security during the first a few trading days. This alternative estimate implies an even larger issuance cost. Based on these yield differences, we further compute the implied cost borne by the Treasury Department both as a fraction of total issuance size and in dollar terms.
As shown in Panel B, based on the yield difference for t=5, the issuance costs for 2-, 5-, and 10-year notes are 9.07, 16.81, and 18.43 basis points of the auction size, respectively. For comparison, the interdealer bid-ask spreads for the on-the-run 2-year, 5-year and 10-year notes are estimated to be 0.66, 1.22, and 2.44 basis points, respectively (see Fleming (2003) ).
Our estimates represent substantial costs to the Treasury Department. In 2007, the last full year in our sample, the implied total cost of issuing Treasury notes amounts to $649 million. While it is by no means clear how part of the above estimated issuance cost can be saved through better designs of the Treasury issuance mechanism, recognizing this cost is undoubtedly an essential first step to assess and improve the efficiency of the mechanism. Motivated by our empirical results, Jin and Yan (2011) analyze a model of security issuance when issuance has a price impact in the secondary market. In particular, they analyze the potential benefits and costs when the seller increases the frequency of auctions and hence reduce the lumpiness of the supply shocks.
A.2. Trading profits and transaction costs
The documented return pattern around Treasury auctions also implies potentially large trading profits. For example, to take advantage of the price movements around 2-year note auctions that take place almost every month in our sample, one can short the onthe-run 2-year note in the t days before each auction, and long a duration-matched portfolio comprising the on-the-run 6-month T-bill and 10-year note to hedge out the interest rate risk. Then one can switch to the reversed positions, long the 2-year note and short the 6-month bill and 10-year note, in the t days after the auction. As shown in (2008)).
Moreover, the correlation between the 10-day pre-auction portfolio return and the 10-day post-auction return is 0.22, with a p-value of 0.002, suggesting that the two lags of the return pattern are indeed caused by the same underlying driver.
The strategy requires large turnover: One needs to complete two "round trips"
each month for both their long and short positions, and hence to pay twice the bid-ask spreads. To examine whether bid-ask spreads can subsume our documented trading profits, we start by exploiting time-series variations in bid-ask spreads in Treasury markets. As noted in prior literature, the bid-ask spreads in Treasury markets generally decline over time (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991 ), Jegadeesh (1993 ), Fleming (2003 ). However, as shown in Panel B of Table V, our simple strategy yields similar returns in the last 10 years of the sample as compared to the full sample, while achieving a much higher Sharpe ratio. In the case of t=10 for example, the annualized Sharpe ratio of our strategy in the last 10 years is 1.44, compared to 1.08 achieved in the full sample. Part of this increase in Sharpe ratio over time is likely due to the improvement in data quality of the CRSP Treasury database (see, e.g., Duffee (1996) ).
To assess the trading profits net of bid-ask spreads more directly, we take bid-ask spread estimates from Fleming (2003) , who calculates daily interdealer bid-ask spreads for on-the-run Treasury securities using firm/market quotes from GovPX for the period of December 1996 to March 2000. He finds that the average bid-ask spreads for 10-year, 2-year, and 6-month Treasury securities are 2.44, 0.66, and 0.37 basis points, respectively. According to our duration estimates, the hedge portfolio has roughly 20%
in 10-year notes and 80% in 6-month T-bills. Thus the bid-ask spread for the whole long-short portfolio is 0.66+2.44×0.2+0.37×0.8=1.46 basis points. Since our trading strategy involves two round trips each month, the total cost is 35.04 (=1.46×2×12) basis points per year. In other words, after taking into account bid-ask spreads, the Sharpe ratio of the strategy is still as high as 0.95 during the last 10 years of our sample.
A.3. Implications for theoretical models
The large Sharpe ratio of our trading strategy calls for a search for additional risk factors that the strategy may be exposed to and, perhaps more likely, market frictions beyond bid-ask spreads that may prevent investors from exploiting this opportunity.
Moreover, the large swings in Treasury returns between the pre-and post-auction periods pose a significant challenge to asset-pricing models. Our most conservative estimate, based on the entire 20-day window around each auction, implies an increase in annualized expected 2-year note return by 2.3% from the pre-auction to post-auction period. For reference, the average 2-year note return premium (over 3-month T-bill returns) is 1.4% in our sample. This large swing in bond premium is hard to explain by existing asset-pricing theories, especially given the recurring nature of this phenomenon.
B. Robustness
The phenomenon documented here is not unique to on-the-run securities. As shown in the lower row of Figure 1 , the yield pattern for off-the-run notes is almost the same as that for the on-the-run securities. We repeated the analysis in Tables II and III for off- the-run notes and get very similar results. We also conduct a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, we repeat our analysis on three subsamples: 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2008 . The main results hold for all subsamples and appear to be stronger for the more recent two decades. Second, since auctions take place in the middle of a day, it is unclear whether the return on the auction day itself should be classified as pre-auction or post-auction. We repeat our analysis by excluding auction day returns and the results are by and large unchanged.
Finally, since Treasury securities accumulate interest payments on each calendar day (rather than trading day), we accordingly adjust for the effect of weekends and holidays on our return patterns. The results, omitted for brevity, are virtually identical to those reported in Tables II and III. V. Interpretations
It seems natural to try to link our documented phenomenon to the information contents in Treasury auctions. Although the date and amount of each auction can be virtually perfectly anticipated, auction outcomes, such as the bid-to-cover ratio and coupon rate, are likely to be informative signals about the Treasury markets and overall economic conditions. If the uncertainty about auctions is resolved gradually during the days leading up to these auctions, we should expect that the average Treasury returns before auctions (including the auction day) be higher than those after. This prediction, however, is exactly the opposite to what we find in the data.
A more plausible interpretation is that Treasury auctions exert significant temporary price impacts in secondary Treasury markets. More precisely, our interpretation has two ingredients. First, primary dealers have limited risk-bearing capacity. In the U.S. Treasury market, primary dealers are expected to participate actively in all auctions and submit meaningful bids. Put differently, primary dealers are expected to acquire large positions in these auctioned securities. Due to limited riskbearing capacity, the dealers need to hedge this to-be-acquired large exposure by shorting similar securities in the secondary Treasury market as well as the when-issued market. These short-selling activities exert significant downward pressure on secondary market prices. Note that primary dealers' short selling in the when-issued market can also depress spot Treasury prices, if the counterparties with long positions in the whenissued market hedge their exposure in the secondary Treasury market.
The second ingredient of our interpretation is that end-investors in Treasury markets are likely constrained from providing liquidity instantly. This point is particularly important since a large amount -relative to auction size -of Treasury securities are also maturing around auctions, indicating that end-investors indeed have enough capital to absorb the supply shock from these auctions. For primary dealers'
shorting activities to have any significant price impact, end-investors' capital mobility has to be imperfect. Our interpretation has a number of further implications, which we explore next.
A. Limited risk-bearing capacity
Primary dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity has the following two additional predictions. First, given the similarities among Treasury notes across maturities, the price pressure resulting from Treasury auctions of one maturity should naturally spill over to Treasury securities with different maturities, and this impact should be stronger if the maturity differential is smaller. Second, the price impact of Treasury auctions should be stronger when the total risk expected to be acquired by primary dealers is higher; for instance, when the auction size is larger and in periods with higher implied Treasury return volatilities.
To test the first prediction, we examine the yield patterns of 10-year notes around 2-and 5-year note auctions. We exclude observations where there is a 10-year note auction within 10 days of a 2-or 5-year note auction, to ensure that we are not picking up the effect of own auctions. 22 Consistent with our prediction, Table VI shows that 10-year note yields increase significantly before both 2-and 5-year note auctions and decrease afterward. Not surprisingly, because of the large difference in maturity between 2-year and 10-year notes, the yield change resulting from 2-year note auctions is small, hovering around one basis point, and is statistically significant in only a few days surrounding auction days. In contrast, 5-year note auctions have a much stronger impact on 10-year yields. The magnitude of the impact is around 3 basis points, and 6 out of the 10 point estimates are significant at the 5% level.
In testing the second prediction, we conduct a simple time-series regression. The dependent variable is the cumulative return of the long-short portfolio defined in Table   V The marginal significance of offering size is likely due to the fact that auctions of other maturities also occur in the vicinity of 2-year note auctions. For instance, in a large part of our sample, there is a 5-year note auction within a few days following each 2-year note auction. Due to the across-maturity spillover effect (Table VI) Taken together, the evidence here lends further support to our hypothesis that, due to limited risk-bearing capacity, primary dealers hedge the risk they are expected to acquire at auctions by short selling similar securities, and thus causing downward price pressure in secondary markets before auctions. In addition, such price impact is more pronounced for Treasury securities that are more similar to those auctioned securities, when the auction amount is larger, or when Treasury markets are more volatile.
B. End-investors' capital mobility
The second ingredient in our interpretation is that end-investors are unresponsive to to Second, we also examine the behavior of bond mutual funds. At the end of our sample, bond mutual funds collectively hold close to 500 billion dollars' worth of Treasury securities, which accounts for around 10% of all private holdings. Index bond mutual funds are likely to avoid newly issued securities due to concerns of tracking errors. Many fixed-income indices usually adjust their composition at the end of each month. As a result, index bond mutual fund managers are likely to be reluctant to purchase the new securities before they are included in the indices they are tracking. In other words, rather than exploiting the yield changes around auctions, index fund might be part of the cause of the phenomenon.
For active bond mutual funds, while we do not directly observe their trading, we gauge their ability to absorb sudden increases in Treasury supply by examining their capital flow patterns around Treasury auctions. Specifically, we obtain a daily series of total net assets and investment returns for three fund classes -bond funds, equity funds, and hybrid funds (which invest in both bonds and equities), from TrimTabs. We then compute the daily investment flow to each fund class in day t as the percentage change in total net assets from t-1 to t, after adjusting for the investment return in day t.
Similar to the tests for bond return patterns around auctions, we compare the difference between the cumulative capital flow to each fund class during the t days subsequent to an auction and the cumulative flow during the t days prior to the auction. We focus on 2-year Treasury note auctions in this test since the flow data are not available before 1998 and there are too few observations for other maturities in the post-1998 period.
The results are shown in Table VIII . Columns 1 and 2 present the flow pattern for bond mutual funds around 2-year note auctions. Overall, there are significantly larger capital inflows to bond mutual funds after Treasury auctions than before these auctions. The difference in cumulative capital flows to bond funds keeps drifting upward after the auction day and peaks on days 9 and 10. During the 10 days after a 2-year note auction, the cumulative capital inflow to bond mutual funds is about 16 (t=3.02) basis points higher than that during the 10 days prior to the auction. For reference, the average daily flow to bond mutual funds in our sample period is only 0.4 basis points each day. The evidence that investors move their capital into bond mutual funds at a higher rate after Treasury auctions than before these auctions suggests that mutual fund investors are slow in reallocating their capital across asset classes, perhaps due to limited attention. 24 Consistent with this view, in further analyses, we find that capital flows to equity and hybrid mutual funds after auctions are generally lower than those before auctions, albeit with marginal statistical significance.
VI. The Impact on Repo Markets
Our interpretation also implies that Treasury auctions can exert a large impact on repo rates. Specifically, primary dealers, in anticipation of the large positions that they are about to assume at auctions, short sell similar securities in the secondary market to hedge the risk. To do so, primary dealers usually borrow Treasury securities through "reverse repo" transactions (from the perspective of their counterparties, these are repo transactions). More specifically, primary dealers lend cash to their counterparties and take Treasury securities as collateral, which they then sell short in the secondary market.
Naturally, primary dealers have stronger incentives to initiate these reverse-repo transactions shortly before Treasury auctions than in other periods. As a result, they would be willing to accept lower interest rates in these transactions, leading to lower repo rates before auctions. Moreover, since this hedging activity is expected to last only for a few days, the impact should be stronger for overnight repo rates than for long-term repo rates.
To test this idea, we obtain daily data on overnight, one-week, and one-month repo rates from Bloomberg. Since our prediction is that repo rates decrease before auctions due to the scarcity of Treasury security collaterals, our analysis is focused on general-collateral repo rates, which are the interest rates in repo contracts backed by Government General Collaterals. Since the repo data are available only for the post-1992 period, we center our analysis on the most frequent 2-year note auctions for statistical power reasons.
We compare the average repo rates after 2-year note auctions with those before.
The results are reported in Table IX . Consistent with our prediction, repo rates in the pre-auction period are significantly lower than those in the post-auction period. For example, as shown in columns 1 and 2, the average overnight repo rate during the 10 days before auctions is, on average, 3.47 basis points lower than during the 10-day period after the auctions, with a t-statistic of 2.21. This rate differential is positive for the entire 20-day window around auction days and reaches its maximum on day 5, with a point estimate of 6.75 basis points and a t-statistic of 4.83. There is a similar but slightly weaker pattern in one-week term repo rates (columns 3 and 4). For example, the average 5-day pre-auction one-week rate is 4.39 (t=4.36) basis points lower than that during the post-auction 5-day period. This pattern almost completely disappears for one-month term repo rates, for which most of the point estimates are indistinguishable from 0. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that primary dealers hedge their risk in the a few days before Treasury auctions, and thus drive down short-term repo rates. We also repeat our analysis on reverse repo rates. Since the relationship between repo and reverse repo rates are similar to that between bid and ask prices, the results based on reverse repo rates, omitted for brevity, are almost identical to those based on repo rates. Our results also pose significant challenges to existing asset-pricing theories and suggest that market frictions are playing an important role even in the most liquid and well-developed financial markets. Hence, explicitly modeling the risk-bearing capacity of broker-dealers in financial markets and the imperfect capital mobility of some classes of large investors might be fruitful directions for future research. This table reports the time-series average of ( ) − (0), which is the yield of an on-therun n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) on day t (where t ranges from -10 to 10) minus the yield of the same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note auction is conducted.
(More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the auction.) The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields are expressed in basis points. T-statistics are based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Treasury yields around subsequent auctions: ( ) − (0) an on-the-run n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) during the t days after a subsequent nyear note auction minus the cumulative return of the same n-year note during the t days before the auction, where t ranges from 1 to 10. (More precisely, the note is on-therun before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the auction.) The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All returns are expressed in basis points. T-statistics are based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respective.
Treasury note returns around subsequent auctions: ∆ ( ) the on-the-run n-year note (n=2,5,10) on day t before the subsequent auction and the yield of the same note on day t after the auction, with t ranging from 1 to 10. (More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the auction.) The auction yield is the maximum winning yield for single-price auctions, and is the weighted-average yield based on the amount issued at each winning yield for multiple-price auctions. This table reports ( ), the cumulative return of a hedge strategy from t days before an auction to t days after, where t ranges from 1 to 10. On the t th day before each auction, we construct a hedge portfolio by going short in the on-the-run 2-year note, and going long in a duration-matched portfolio of the on-the-run 6-month T-bill and 10-year note. We hold this hedge portfolio until the auction day, and then reverse our positions: We now go long in the same 2-year note (which just becomes the first off-therun note) and go short in the duration-matched portfolio of the on-the-run 6-month Tbill and on-the-run 10-year note. We hold this portfolio until the t th day after the auction. The full sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. Returns are expressed in basis points. Sharpe Ratio is the annualized Sharpe ratio for this trading strategy. T-statistics are based on standard errors that are Newey-West adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table reports the time-series average of ( ) − (0), which is the yield of an on-therun 10-year Treasury note on day t (where t ranges from -5 to 5) minus the yield of the same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note (n=2,5) auction is conducted.
(More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes off-the-run after the auction.) We exclude 2-and 5-year note auctions that are within one week of any 10-year note auction. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields are expressed in basis points. T-statistics are based on standard errors that are NeweyWest adjusted up to 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. (10), is described in Table V . Offering Amount is the logarithm of the amount in dollars offered by the Treasury Department in the 2-year note auction. Implied Volatility is the model-free maturity-weighted implied volatility of nearest-to-expiry atthe-money options on the 30-year, 10-year, and 5-year Treasury securities at the end of the previous month. The dependent variable in Panel B is the daily return of on-the-run 2-year Treasury notes, adjusted by the average daily return in the 20-day windows surrounding it.
( ) is the logarithm of the aggregate offering amount from all Treasury note auctions of any maturity type during the t days prior to the return date minus that during the t days subsequent to the return date. The sample period is Solid lines in these figures correspond to the time-series average of ( ) − (0), which is the yield of the n-year Treasury note (n=2,5,10) on day t (where t ranges from -5 to 5) minus the yield of the same note on the day when a subsequent n-year note auction is conducted. (More precisely, the note is on-the-run before the auction and becomes offthe-run after the auction.) The dotted lines are the 95% confidence interval. The top three figures are for on-the-run Treasury notes, and the bottom three figures are for the first off-the-run notes. The sample period is from January 1980 to June 2008. All yields are expressed in basis points.
